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MEV Economics: Builders, Searchers, Validators

The full MEV value chain. Searchers, builders (Titan, BuilderNet, Quasar), MEV-Boost relays, validators, block construction economics, the "trust the relay" assumption versus optimistic relays and ePBS, fair sequencing services (Espresso, Astria), MEV redistribution (CowSwap MEV Blocker), Solana MEV economics (Jito $674M), and the "MEV is inevitable vs MEV is a bug" thesis.

17 min · expert · part of MEV & The Dark Forest

The Full Value Chain

The previous lessons covered what MEV is and how to defend against it as a user. This lesson zooms out: who are the actors in the MEV economy, how does value flow between them, and what are the structural debates about whether MEV is a fixable bug or an inevitable feature of permissionless markets? The value chain has four primary actors: searchers, builders, relays, and validators. Each plays a distinct role, captures a distinct portion of MEV, and faces distinct economic incentives and risks. The interactions between them shape every Ethereum block — and increasingly, every Solana slot — that gets produced today. Understanding the value chain matters for several audiences. For users, it clarifies where the dollars they lose to sandwich attacks actually flow. For builders and developers, it reveals the strategic landscape they operate in. For policymakers and researchers, it frames the debates about MEV redistribution, fair sequencing, and protocol-level reforms (Optimistic Relays, ePBS, etc.). By the end of this lesson, you should be able to explain how a profitable arbitrage transaction goes from a searcher's bot through the builder market through MEV-Boost to the validator who proposes the block — and why each step in that chain takes a specific cut of the value.

Also in this lesson

  • Searchers and Builders
  • Relays and Validators
  • Block Construction Economics and the Trust Problem
  • MEV Redistribution and Solana MEV Economics
  • The "MEV Is Inevitable" vs "MEV Is a Bug" Debate
  • For Deeper Reading

Key terms

Searcher
Actor (typically an individual or small team) running automated bots that identify MEV opportunities (arbitrage, liquidations, sandwiches, etc.) and submit bundles to builders. Typically earn ~30% of gross MEV. Hundreds of independent searchers in the ecosystem.
Builder
Specialized firm that combines searcher bundles into profitable blocks and bids them to validators. Highly consolidated market: Titan Builder ~52%, BuilderNet ~25%, Quasar ~15% as of April 2026.
Relay (MEV-Boost)
Trusted intermediary between builders and validators. Receives sealed blocks from builders, shows headers to validators, enforces commit-before-reveal pattern. Major relays: Flashbots, BuilderNet, Ultrasound, Eden, Manifold.
Trust the Relay Assumption
Architectural weakness of MEV-Boost: validators must trust relays not to leak block contents, front-run commitments, or collude with builders. Mitigated by validators connecting to multiple relays.
Optimistic Relays
Reform to MEV-Boost where the relay commits to validator that block is valid; if wrong, relay is slashed. Reduces but does not eliminate trust requirement.
ePBS (Enshrined Proposer-Builder Separation)
Protocol-level reform to bring MEV-Boost-like functionality into Ethereum consensus directly, eliminating the need for trusted relays. On Ethereum roadmap; in research as of 2026.
Inclusion Lists
Proposed mechanism allowing validators to specify transactions that builders must include in any block. Reduces builder censorship discretion.
Fair Sequencing Services (FSS)
Cryptographic protocols that enforce fair transaction ordering, eliminating MEV at the protocol level. Examples: Espresso Sequencer (used by several L2s), Astria (similar shared sequencer).
CowSwap MEV Blocker (Redistribution)
CoW DAO's public RPC service that routes through builders with anti-sandwich and revenue-sharing agreements. Shares 90% of winning searcher's bid back to the user. Most user-favorable MEV-redistribution model in production.
Validator MEV Income
Additional income validators earn via MEV-Boost on top of standard staking rewards. Typical 0.04-0.10 ETH per proposed block from MEV; aggregate annual uplift of 20-40% on top of base staking returns.
Jito (Solana)
Dominant Solana MEV infrastructure used by ~93% of Solana validators. Jito-Solana validator client routes bundles through tip-based auctions. Cumulative tips paid to validators/stakers: ~$674M through end-2024.
MEV Inevitability vs Bug Thesis
Two opposing views of MEV. Inevitability: MEV is structural to any permissionless market with ordering; the goal is transparency and redistribution. Bug: MEV is a fixable artifact of immature protocol design; cryptographic sequencing and batch auctions can eliminate it.

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