The Searcher Stack
Mempool subscribers, simulation engines, bundle submission paths, and the builder relationships that make profitable MEV possible.
35 min · expert · part of MEV Searcher Strategies
What you'll learn
- What a Searcher Actually Does
- Layer 1: Mempool Subscribers and Node Choice
- Layer 2: Simulation Engines
- Layer 3: Bundle Submission and Builder Relationships
- The Numbers: What a Searcher Actually Earns
- For Deeper Reading
Key terms
- MEV (Maximal Extractable Value)
- The profit a sophisticated actor can capture by reordering, inserting, or censoring transactions inside a block. Cumulative measurable Ethereum MEV exceeded $1.8B by mid-2025.
- Searcher
- An independent firm or individual who monitors the mempool, simulates opportunities locally, and submits bundles to builders for inclusion in blocks. The "labor" side of MEV extraction.
- Mempool
- The pool of pending transactions broadcast to the network but not yet included in a block. Public mempool transactions are visible to anyone; private flow bypasses it.
- revm
- A Rust implementation of the EVM maintained by Paradigm. The de facto simulation engine for modern searcher stacks because it is 10-50x faster than geth interpretation for repeated simulation.
- Bundle
- A list of transactions submitted atomically to a builder. Either all execute in the specified order at the top of a target block, or the whole bundle is excluded. Atomicity is what makes MEV economically viable.
- Builder
- A specialized firm that assembles Ethereum blocks from mempool transactions and searcher bundles, then sells the assembled block to validators via MEV-Boost. Major builders: Beaverbuild, Titan, Flashbots, rsync.
- Flashbots Builder API
- The original searcher submission endpoint, exposing eth_sendBundle and mev_sendBundle methods. Flashbots historically held 40-60% MEV-Boost share; competition has reduced that to roughly 15-25% by 2025-2026.
- Coinbase transfer / priority fee
- The payment a searcher makes to the block proposer (validator) in exchange for including the bundle. Typically 60-90% of gross extracted value.
- Latency budget
- The 100-400ms window between observing a transaction in the mempool and submitting a competing bundle. Every component of the searcher stack consumes part of this budget.
- MEV-Share
- Flashbots' opt-in protocol (2023) that matches user transactions with searcher bundles and refunds a share of captured MEV to the original user. Constructive MEV alternative to extractive private-mempool routing.
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Open lessonEducational only — not financial advice.
